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Abstract
The French hospitals sector is split  between sub-sectors, with different employment status (civil  servant 
versus private employment contract). Industrial relations differs. Nevertheless, differences between the sub-
sectors are not very important. Quality rules and health regulation could explain why different labour market 
institutions do not lead to a strong divide in employment and working conditions.      
Introduction
As in some other European countries (Germany,  Jaherling, 2007), the French hospital  sector is divided 
between a dominant public segment, a non for profit and a for profit segment.  If these segments are not 
strictly on the same activities, nevertheless, they are in competition for patients, mainly between the public 
and the for profit segments. Another dimension of the competition is the labour market. In both segments, 
they compete mainly for skilled workers but also for semi-skilled and at a less degree unskilled one’s (Nurse, 
Nurse assistant and various kind of cleaners and others low skilled workers) : same type of jobs, mainly 
female work,.
The institutions on the labour market are quite different. In the public sector, the French civil servant status is 
predominant, but one can notice a growing use of private contracts (fixed term) at the boarder of the classical 
public status. In the private for profit sector, the labour contract is a classical open ended contract, but one 
can notice also an  use of fixed term contract, of temp agencies.
In both cases, the core female workers are very stable and, at the periphery, a reserve army is waiting for 
permanent jobs. This periphery is ruled by mimicry to the core labour market, with implicit seniority rules. 
Work organisation and working conditions do not differ a lot. 
Despite different level and forms of unionisation, the two sub-sectors seems to be highly articulated. It is 
partly due to the fact that most unions are gathering in the same organisation the workers of the private and 
of the public sector. It is also probably due to the competition on the labour market. But another hypothesis is 
the strength of the public « quality rules » which are imposed in the same way to the two segments. 
In a first section, we will briefly present some characteristics of the sector. In a second section, we compare 
the  main work and employment characteristics of the low/semi skilled segment of the work force. In a third 
section, we will discuss the factors explaining the divergent and convergent trends between the two sectors.
This paper relies on the general methodology identified for research on “low-wage work.” It uses a set of 
national  statistical  data,  primarily  from the Ministry of  Health (in particular,  annual statistics  on health 
institutions and the 2003 survey on working conditions in hospitals). Eight case studies were done in 2005 
and 2006 on mid-sized hospitals and clinics (100 to 800 beds, excluding university hospitals). Four are 
public hospitals, four are private for-profit clinics. Four are located in labour markets with a high rate of 
unemployment  and  four  in  tighter  markets.  In  each  case  study,  between twelve  and  fifteen  in-depth 
interviews were conducted with  hospital  management  (executive  director,  human resources manager, 
nursing care manager), union leaders, nurse’s aides (NAs), and hospital service workers (ASHs), primarily 
in medical units. In one case, a hospital that subcontracts some of its work, the interviews also dealt with 
the subcontractor’s business and workers. We thanks the Russell Sage foundation for its support. 
1.Public/private for profit hospitals : an institutional divide 
For historical reasons, the French hospitals have been divided in three sub-sectors : a dominant public one, 
a private non for profit one and a private for profit. Size, medical specialities, employment status of the work 
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force are different. In the following who will focus only on the public and the for profit sectors, which are 
dominant in the MSO activities.     
1.1 The tow sub-sectors
A public hospital sector whose vocation was to care for the poor gradually came to coexist with a voluntary 
and for-profit private sector intended primarily for well-off patients. That for-profit sector, overhauled in the 
late 1950s, grew significantly until the 1990s, while granting access to less fortunate members of society. For 
its part, the public hospital underwent a transformation, becoming more attractive and less restricted to the 
working class. As a result, and within a context of intense budget constraints, the private sector has lost 
ground in the last ten years.
For medical, surgical, and obstetric (MSO) services alone, on which this paper deals more specifically, the 
for-profit private sector represents 26 percent of beds, the public 65 percent, and the non for profit sector 9 
percent. The for-profit private sector is undergoing a strong trend toward concentration, with a drop in the 
number  of  establishments  and  a  rise  in  their  size.  In  medicine,  the  average  number  of  beds  per 
establishment has risen from 70 to 84. The public sector is also experiencing a reduction in the number of 
establishments, but the average number of medicine beds per establishment has fallen as well (from 220 to 
210).
Specialization is high in the for-profit private sector. That is particularly true for surgery (where its share is 
rising), for obstetrics (where its share has recently dropped), and for certain medical disciplines, but also for 
medium-term care (primarily  follow-up and convalescent care).  That specialization is part of a quest  for 
profitable “niches”—costly medical procedures (fitting prostheses, for example) and predictable care services 
that ensure a high use rate for technical equipment and beds. Within our sample, all the private clinics were 
100 percent  specialized in MSO services.  Nevertheless,  they belonged to groups with other operations, 
retirement or convalescent homes, for instance. Public hospitals are more diversified and more integrated, 
with a mix of MSO and psychiatric services and sometimes an integrated retirement home.
1.2 Civil servant and private labour contracts
Unlike the United States (Appelbaum et alii, 2003) and European countries other than France, the majority of 
workers in public hospitals are civil  servants  (about 80 percent).  Because of  the scope of  these public 
hospitals, civil servants hold more than half of all jobs in the hospital sector as a whole (public and private). 
In 1955, wage regulations were applied uniformly in all public hospitals. These regulations were renewed in 
1986, becoming totally integrated into civil service regulations. They govern all questions relating to hiring, 
mobility, wages, bonuses, and leaves. They are subject to negotiations and adjustments between the state, 
the unions, and public hospital representatives and can be compared to a collective bargaining agreement. 
But the state plays a determining role. For example, annual wage increases are decided by the central 
government for the entire public sector, hospitals included. A “licensed”i hospital worker is recruited “for life.” 
But the unions play a major role through a set of structures of representation, both at the individual hospital 
level  and at  the national  level.  The force of  civil  service regulations characteristic  of  the French model 
explains the homogeneity in our public hospitals.
In the for profit hospitals, one collective agreement applies to all the hospitals. As usually in France, it is 
bargained at  the sectoral  level,  and later  made compulsory by a  state regulation.  Nevertheless,  private 
hospitals have a greater room for manoeuvre than in the public sector. In the past, the local arrangements 
had to be on the benefit of the employees (better advantages than in the collective agreement). Since 2004 a 
kind of opt out clause has been introduced in the French private industrial relation system. It was too early 
when our case studies were done to grasp the impact of this new law. But according to an other research, 
the  employer  organisation  is  not  so  keen  to  use  it  (Jobert,  Saglio,  2005).  Nevertheless,  the  sectoral 
organisation could be said as a weak one. Most of the hospitals are small organisations. And when they are 
owned by doctors, the owners do not regards themselves as “employers” and are unlucky to follow labour 
market regulations. 
This institutional context, the market direct pressure on the for profit sector could lead to high differences in 
the employment and working conditions. In the next section, we will  see that the differences are not so 
strong. The within variation is sometimes higher than the between one. 
 
2.Employment and working conditions : less differences than forecasted
It is not possible to review all the employment and working conditions. We will concentrate on some key 
characteristics
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2.1The prevalence of internal labour markets
In the case of NAs and ASHs, hospitals (public or private) exemplify the internal labour market in the sense 
defined by Doeringer and Piore (1971), particularly since seniority is respected when workers move from one 
institution to another. Wage progression is guaranteed once a worker has entered the internal market and 
the turnover rate is very low. Internal !mobility, vertical or not is also quite frequent (Arborio, 2001). The table 
below summarizes the major national data.
Table 1 : indicators of ILM 
Public private for profit
N NA ASH N NA ASH
Seniority> 10 years 57% 62% 60% 47% 58% 54%
Changing hospital* 6% 6% 1% 2% 3% 1%
Wage seniority gap** 43% 39% 20% 31% 30% 23%
 *2001/2003
** 3-6 years/>20 years, full time
Source : Dress, survey on working conditions 2003, authors’ 
calculations.
Civil service regulations are, of course, playing a major role. But seniority in private clinics is also important 
and the turnover rate very low. Policies in private hospitals are designed to produce a loyal workforce. In 
addition to the wage benefits linked to seniority—stipulated by the collective agreement—there are non-wage 
benefits,  sometimes  associated  with  a  strong  paternalistic  policy  (loans  to  alleviate  financial  troubles, 
housing assistance in two clinics). The internal market model in the private sector is thus similar to that in the 
public sector.
2.2Wage differential
In both sub-sectors, wage progression based on seniority is significant, more for  NAs than for ASHs (see 
table 1). Lifetime wages are better for NAs in the public sector than in the private, a cause for complaints 
about the collective  agreement  structure in  some clinics.  For  ASHs,  conversely,  the financial  benefit  of 
seniority is slightly better in the private sector.
In both sub-sectors, various fringe benefits supplement the base salary. First, there is a year-end bonus, the 
equivalent of a month’s wages, theoretically adjusted in the public sector to reflect employee absences. In 
the private hospitals, the year-end bonus took the form of profit-sharing. But in two of the clinics, a conflict 
arising in the wake of France’s compulsory thirty-five hour workweek has turned that profit-sharing benefit 
into an “automatic” year-end bonus granted to everyone. Second, there are bonuses related to scheduling 
(overtime pay for night and weekend work) and to working conditions. These benefits, taken together, can 
amount to 20 percent of base salary. They are all  automatic, linked to the particular job. There was no 
individualization of salary in any of the cases studies.
Nevertheless, the wage differential between the public and private sectors remains in force, to the advantage 
of the public sector. In 2000 (Brahami, 2002), these differences were fairly large. By 2003 (Collet, 2005), the 
gap had narrowed, the result of the universal application of the thirty-five hour workweek and more rapid 
wage increases in the private sector. But all things being equal, wage scales remain 11 percent lower in the 
private sector.
That difference is noticeable in the case studies. Workers in the private sector mention discrepancies of 200 
to 400 euros a month compared to the public sector. These discrepancies account for the greater labor 
demands being voiced in the private sector.  Hence, in two clinics, wage disputes primarily  targeted the 
methods for granting benefits. In the public sector, conversely, the disputes tend to be national, linked to the 
general modalities for granting wage increases in civil service jobs. But these discrepancies do not lead to a 
very high mobility of employees from the private to the public sector. Several reasons for this can be put 
forward: the cost of such mobility, given that access to the public sector is competitive and waiting lines are 
already  very  long;  organization of  work  time (more regular  work schedules are  often mentioned as  an 
advantage in the private sector); the smaller size of private clinics, where the work atmosphere is judged 
more convivial than in public hospitals (said to be “like factories”). A few of the employees polled (especially 
NAs) who had a chance to enter the public sector nonetheless chose the private sector,  despite lower 
wages.
2.3External flexibility and the labour army reserve
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If most of the employees are in the core work force, all our hospitals are managing and external “labour 
reserve army”. Various reasons, ranging from the need of a productive flexibility (operating 365 days a year, 
wage costs, better malleability of the work force… are emphasizes by the managers. Two main solutions are 
coexisting. 
a)The first solution is outsourcing. This is mainly used for catering, cleaning common areas and washing 
linen and sometimes for more specialized functions (informatics, recurrent works on the building) ii. Here , 
it  is  necessary to underline the importance of  labor  market  institutions.  When writing contracts  with 
external providers, it is stated that the provider that wins the tender offer will keep employees. As in 
Great Britain, we find “permanent” employees under the authority of the provider  or entirely transferred 
to  the  providers’  management.  A  private  hospital  is  the  only  case  of  total  outsourcing  of  cleaning 
services. At the moment of our research, outsourcing was in course, justified by the directions’ aim of 
simplifying management (due to the small size of the clinic), rather than economizing. An assessment 
was not possible at the time, but consequences are strong. ASH became the providers’ employees, were 
attached to their  collective agreement and, symbolically,  carry their  blouse. Their  salary levels were 
maintained  in  principal,  but  there  is  great  confusion  concerning  the  different  structures  (namely 
integrated bonus or not). Interviewed employees considered that they had lost certain benefits and were 
concerned with upcoming evolutions. As for the manager of the subcontracting company, he foresees 
that  future  hiring  will  be  made  at  minimum  wage.  Furthermore,  problems  concerning  quality  are 
emerging.
b)The second solution is the use of a wide range of  atypical contracts, which are more or less breaking 
with the  civil servant status and the private collective agreement. Table 2 provides our results for private 
and public hospitals.  On of the key characteristic (which is classical on the French labour market) is the 
higher use of theses solutions by the public sector. On the one hand, public hospitals have strict binding 
rules regarding the level of the employment of civil  servants. On the other hand, the duration of the 
waiting list before being licensed is longer than in the private sector (see Causse, Méhaut 2007 and 
Arborio Méhaut 2007 for a deeper analysis).       
Table 2 : Strategies regarding the atypical contracts 
Contract
Cases
Short  fixed 
term  
Long  fixed 
term
(>3 months)
Open 
ended
Public 
scheme
Temp. % 
(Equivale
nt full 
time)
Concentration
Apub Yes Yes  Yes Numerous No 18% ASH
Cpub Yes Yes Yes Numerous No 36% ASH/NA
Bpub Yes Numerous No Yes, weak No 18% ASH 52%
Dpub Yes Yes No Yes, weak No 24% ASH 44%
Gpriv Numerous * * No n.a. ASH/NA
Fpriv Numerous Numerous * * Yes 14% ASH/NA
Rpiv Yes Yes * * Yes 12,5% ASH/NA
Epriv Yes Yes * * Yes 16,5% Inf/NA/ASH
2.4 Working time
The 35 hours regulation applies to both sectors. It was implemented earlier in the private for profit hospitals, 
and usually  with a higher  number of  job creations than in the public  one.  The public hospital  sector  is 
regarded as one of the sector were the 35hours regulation has the worse consequences on the work load. In 
our case studies we found more complaint about this workload in public hospitals. 
In our case studies, choices regarding the shift and weekly working time organisation are different.  In 3 
among our 4 private hospitals the work schedules tend toward longer days than in the 5 other cases (ten to 
twelve hours, 7/8 hours in the others). Over the course of a month, workers alternate between a “short” week 
(three workdays) and a “long” week (five days, including a weekend). The long-day schedule tends to be 
valued by the staff:  there is a greater predictability of schedules, more days off, no alternating between 
getting up early and getting home late, and less commute time. That benefit accounts for some of the appeal 
of the private sector and partly compensates for lower wages. In both sectors, part time is expanding, more 
quickly for the NA than for the ASH. But the private sector clinics in our sample try to limit part-time. 
 
2.5 Work organisation
In  our  sample,  we found differences between hospitals  regarding the work organisation,  but  it  was not 
possible to differentiate the public/private strategies (see Méhaut, 2007 for more details). 
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 The  NAs  are  usually  performing  the  same  basic  tasks  (they  are  qualified  NAs,  with  a  compulsory 
qualification, and  the boarder with the nurses’ tasks are defined by what a nurse can perform as “medical 
acts”.  In all our cases studies, NAs’ job profile is quite similar : a mix of elementary nursing, cleaning tasks, 
contacts  with the patient  and its  family,  nutrition,  some basic  medical  acts  (measuring glycaemia),  and 
participation to the wards’ coordination (meetings, knowledge of the patient file…). When differences occur, 
they are linked on the one hand to relationship with the nurses (close cooperation or not) and on the other 
hand to the position of the ASHs. In the former case, one can hardly speak of hospitals’ strategies ; it is more 
the product of the working community at the ward level. In the later case, hospitals strategies account. 
In the traditional organization of a hospital, the ASH is also an integral part of the unit. Her main job is to 
clean the rooms (empty or  occupied)  and common areas.  Theoretically,  the area around the patient  is 
cleaned  by  the  NA.  The  two  may  work  together,  in  making  up  empty  beds,  for  example.  In  addition, 
depending on the hospital’s organizational choices but also on the staff arrangements within the units, she 
may distribute pitchers of water to the patient, do the dishes, and distribute or help in distributing meal trays. 
ASHs may also help to get a patient into a chair, may reply when the patient buzzes for help, and may 
sometimes run a few errands. In hospitals where ASHs are most thoroughly integrated into the unit, they also 
attend change-of-shift meetings and are familiar with pathologies, with the particular cases. They often have 
contact with patients and their families. But we found also in half of our cases studies a trend towards a more 
tayloristic specialisation of  the ASHs as cleaners, on the model of the hostels housekeepers (restricting 
and/or forbidding the contact with the patient). Again, here  it was the case in some public hospitals as well  
as in some private one’s.
 In conclusion of this section, we must emphasized that, starting with an a priori clear contrast between the 
private  and  the  public  sector,  we  ended with  a  more  burred  picture.  The  same fundamental  model  of 
employment seems to be at work in both sectors.      
3.Public/private hospitals : a common model of employment ? 
The French employment  and social  model  is  usually  characterised by a  strong opposition between the 
private and the public sector (Askenazy and alii, 2007). The civil servant status is regarded as the best one 
and is a kind of reference for most of the unions’ claims, namely regarding the employment stability. In the 
hospitals sector, the figure is more blurred. As in the whole public sector (xx, xx) , wages (at the bottom of 
the hierarchy) are higher in the public sector. Employment stability does not differ and moreover, the public 
sector provides a higher share of atypical contracts… How to explain such similarities ?  We develop  now 
four main arguments.      
3.1 A common system of production
The first one, very classical in the literature, is the technical argument : for the same product, with the same 
technologies, there  is one best way. Mainly developed for the industrial sector, this argument could also be 
applied to the health sector. Speaking about our categories (NAs and AHS), we must take the technology in 
a broad sense : on the one hand the structure of the building and, on the other hand, the organisational 
choices. Most of our hospitals are still  organised around wards, which are at the core of the production 
organisation. And the traditional ward of the 70’s was an integrated one, mixing the various ingredients of the 
productive system (medical cure, care and housing). Moreover, most of the hospitals (private and public) in 
our sample were build or rebuild at the end of the 60’s, beginning of the seventies. The internal organisation 
of the building fits  with the “ward model”  and, when we were in a ward during our survey,  it  was quite 
impossible to say if  it  was a public or a private hospital.  Last but  not least,  the management tools (for 
example to analyse the work load, the employment needs) are often outdated and the same in both sectors. 
Nevertheless, this technological argument is also put in question in a lot of international comparisons, which 
put emphasis on the “societal effect”, on the varieties of capitalism…(Maurice, Sellier, Silvestre, 1982)  In the 
hospital sector, we found also huge differences between countries despite the same system of production. 
So other arguments must be mobilized. 
      
3.2 The coordinated industrial relation system
Despite the fragmentation of the unions (5 main unions for the hospital sector, but also other specific unions 
and other professional organisations), the public and private employees are often organised within a same 
sectoral federation. If local coordinations are sometimes weak, exchanges at the national level are stronger. 
And very often, the civil servant status is used as a kind of benchmark in the unions’ claims.  The public 
sector continues to lead wage settlements and has sustained a relatively wide premium in average pay – at 
around 11% (Collet, 2005). It generates pressures towards greater coordination. Indeed, during the drafting 
of the new collective agreement of the private sector hospitals in 2002, it was stated that, “the parties intend 
to further improve the employees’ work conditions, in the framework of a convergence of wage rates of public 
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and private hospital employees.”. Employers organization, on the other side, are keen to avoid poaching 
strategies. They claim also for a levelling of the employment and wages conditions.
 In the case of Germany, the levelling process seems to be a downward spiral (Jaerhling 2007). It is not yet 
the case in France. The highly centralised system of collective bargaining, the role of the state acting also in 
the private sector, the importance and attractiveness of the civil servant status (half of the total work force) 
exert common pressure on the two sub sectors.  
3.3 The pressure of the labour market
Today, with the rather high level of unemployment, especially for unskilled women workers, it is difficult to 
speak of tight labour markets. In our sample, we choose private and public hospitals in various local areas, 
with low or high level of unemployment. This contrast was not operating to explain differences (except for the 
use of public schemes in public hospitals). All our hospitals do not face any problem to recruit ASHs. For this 
category, labour market pressure is not strong. Moreover, both public and private subsectors are offering 
wages and employment conditions which are better than in other sectors such as retail  or hostels. This 
attractiveness could allow different trends between private and public hospitals. It was not the case. So other 
explanations must be mobilised. Moreover, looking at the other categories ( NAs and Nurses) one can see 
that on the one hand the common standard of qualification push towards a convergence. On the other hand, 
tighter labour markets exert also pressures for a wage harmonisation. In some of our case studies, the 
private clinics were offering wages for the nurses 15% above the collective agreement (and sometimes 
above the public  hospitals),  in  order  to retain  nurses.  For  the NAs,  some of  the HRM managers were 
complaining about the collective agreement, not very attractive compared to the public civil servant status. 
No clear solutions were provided. But again, the NAs' labour market was said as quite soft. Nevertheless, if 
the employment forecast are true (lower unemployment rate in the future, tensions in all the jobs related to 
health and home care), the “law of the market” could be reinforced, pushing first the private sector to offer 
better wages...and may be in a later step, putting in question the public sector grids.         
3.4 The health regulations : same pressures and quality rules ?           
Regulations governing the health system have a major impact, in that they are common to public and private 
hospitals. The two sub sectors depend on the same major source of financing (the national social security 
system) and on similar financing rules. In the recent time, they will follow the new DRGs funding principle (to 
be fully implemented in the next years). Some official reports are emphasizing the differences in wages costs 
between the various sub-sectors (Bartoli, Bras, 2007). They conclude to the need of an harmonisation of 
these conditions...but on what bases ? The upper, the average, the lower ? Clearly its is not a “market led 
choice”, as in this case, some hospitals will disappeared. And the State and the health authority want to 
control the supply of health provision in a local area. Moreover, Public authorities are pushing towards more 
integration  between  the  public  and  private  sector  :  cooperation  in  the  supply  of  services,  sometimes, 
grouping the hospitals (private and public in the same building to share some in-house services). One of our 
case study was an experiment in this way. At the time of our survey, The private clinic and the hospitals were 
in the same building. Some civil servant where sometimes working in the private clinic and some private 
employees in the hospital. Whether a “two tiers” labour force will remains and/or develops (on the UK model 
of the PPI) was unclear. But the strongest hypothesis would be a levelling of the wage differential, and a 
stable divide between private and public employment status.    
Moreover, private clinics and public hospitals are subject to a set of norms that play a role in standardizing 
job descriptions and working conditions. They concern the conditions for operating a hospital: for example, 
there  is  a  minimum  requirement  for  the  number  of  nurses  and  nurse’s  aides  on  the  job.  They  also 
increasingly  concern a  certain  number  of  procedures that  must  be respected,  and these have a  direct 
influence on the nature and volume of the staff’s work: respect for the patient,  codified in the charter of 
patient’s rights and duties, rules for pain management, and hygiene regulations designed to fight nosocomial 
infections. These rules, which are similar to the quality control practiced in industry, influence job description 
(definition of protocols and procedures), accountability (records kept in the patient’s file), and the skill level 
and structure of the labor force. In most of our case studies, both public and private hospitals were engaged 
in a trend to upgrade the skills' levels, both for the NA (eradicating the unqualified NAs) and for the ASHs 
(hiring only qualified ASHs with a basic VET).   
Conclusion
The health sector, despite high differences in its structure and its funding remains, in most of the european 
countries highly controlled by the state or a public health authority. An obvious tension exists between the 
quality of the care and the cost control. As in most services, the wage costs represent a significant share in 
the hospitals expenditures and as the budget pressure is stronger and stronger, hospitals are looking for 
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various solutions.  Increasing the productivity is a first  way.  This increase is mainly implemented by the 
shortening of the lengh in stays, due to the evolution of the medical technologies (more and more day care) 
rather than by an increase of the work load of the employees in the classical wards. And due to the tension 
between quality and costs, the health authority is maintaining or reinforcing its controls over the quality, 
including the well being of the patient, the cleaningless of the hospitals. In the Netherlands (Van der Meer, 
2007) and in the UK (Grimshaw, Caroll, 2007), where the public hospital sector is the only one, a highly 
coordinated system of industrial relations is remaining or reinforcing (UK). Combined with the quality control 
of  the  health  authority,  it  produces  rather  homogenous  employment  and  working  conditions  for  the 
employees (including recent new trend in the UK where the outsourced work force has to be treated in a 
similar way as the  hospitals work force). In France, despite an heterogeneous hospitals' sector, the weakest 
part of the work force (semi or unskilled women) seems, today, benefiting of better conditions than in other 
female services sector. The quite centralised and coordinated industrial relation system and the quality rules 
(common to  public  and private  hospitals)  are  producing an homogenity  which looks  like  the NL or  UK 
situation, despite the differences and competition between the public and the private sector, and despite the 
high level of unemployment for the unskilled women. Germany, (Jaerhling, 2007) is a different national case 
where a negative spiral is at work, and where the public sector is following the "low road" of the private one. 
This is a puzzling question for a future comparison.                  
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i In what follows, we use the term “licensed” to designate civil servants in the public sector. By extension, it 
will also be used to designate workers with an unlimited-term contract in the private sector. That is the word 
used by everyone we met to differentiate permanent workers from those with limited-term contracts. 
iiOn the contrary, some public hospitals (Mpub, Apub) will keep their laundry service for example and will be 
providers for other hospitals or nursing homes. 
